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May 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH  
THE PRESIDENT



1. I reported briefly on the Copenhagen Conference, making two particular points:

(1) That the passion for a Summit conference seemed to have cooled down and that it was now being appraised as something to be judged on its own merits rather than as something which emotionally must be accepted;

(2) The strong feeling of the Europeans that we should not "break the package" to the extent of disassociating of nuclear from conventional armament.

The President indicated that while he thought that from the standpoint of the United States, and indeed of the world, the elimination of nuclear weapons, if it could be accomplished, would itself be a great step forward, probably we should take account of European sensibilities in this matter.

2. I spoke briefly of my trip to Berlin and of the stimulating atmosphere, and also of my stop in Paris and the talk with Faure about Algeria.

3. We discussed an intimation from the British Embassy that they would like to have a U.S. plane to take Macmillan to and from De Pauw University. The President said he was reluctant to set this precedent.

I also spoke about Selwyn Lloyd's desire to come over and the President deplored the turning of this "casual visit" into a full-scale conference. I said that Lloyd had suggested that perhaps we should make it such and include the French. The President did not seem particularly happy at this thought. It was left that I would speak informally to Harold Caccia about this.

4. We spoke briefly about the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act. The President felt anxious that this should move ahead.

5. We also spoke briefly about Lebanon and about Indonesia.

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8. We reviewed in some detail the Khrushchev letter. The President said he was in doubt whether the offer to put experts to work was unconditional or conditioned upon a prior agreement to suspend testing. I said I interpreted the letter to mean that they were prepared to have experts study controls without prior commitment. I said that I assumed we would want to consider bringing the British experts in and the President said he assumed so. He urged that we should act promptly in making a reply.



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